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Systems of Human and Intellectual Capital 
Brett M. Frischmann* & Mark P. McKenna** 
I. Introduction 
 Orly Lobel’s The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the 
Reach of Intellectual Property makes two significant contributions, each of 
which individually would have made her project important.  First, Lobel 
outlines the contours of the “new” field of human capital law, a field that cuts 
across a wide array of different bodies of law: employment law, contract law, 
corporate law and related areas of business, entertainment, sports, and high 
technology law; copyright, patent, trade secrecy, trademark, and related areas 
of intellectual property law; antitrust and potentially other forms of 
regulation.1  Human capital law is not defined by the apparent intersections 
among legal doctrines or by its potential for fruitful interdisciplinary 
explorations, but instead by its subject matter.  It is, one might say, a horizontal 
layer that cuts across a number of the different vertical silos, important not 
only in its own right because of the content of that layer (human capital) but 
also for the influence it has on the various vertical silos.  As Lobel ably 
demonstrates, it is important to see human capital law as a coherent category 
because the collective effects across the various legal regimes cannot be 
appreciated within any particular legal category.  
 
* Brett M. Frischmann is Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property and 
Information Law Program at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
** Mark P. McKenna is Associate Dean, Professor of Law, and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow 
at the Notre Dame Law School.  We thank Orly Lobel, both for writing such an important article 
and for her feedback on our Response. 
1. See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of 
Intellectual Property, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 789, 790 (2015). 
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 Professor Lobel’s second contribution relates to her warning “against the 
devastating effects of the growing enclosure of cognitive capacities in 
contemporary markets.”2  Given the predilections of legal scholarship, we 
suspect that most would view this as the more important of the two 
contributions.  We share that sentiment, but probably for different reasons.  
While we appreciate the warning and are largely persuaded by Professor 
Lobel’s characterization of both the growing enclosure and its potential 
consequences, we think her criticism remains tentative and rests on an 
uncertain normative foundation.  Professor Lobel appears to ground her 
analysis in conventional law and economics, given her references to efficiency 
and welfare.3  But there are undercurrents of alternatives, such as Amartya 
Sen’s capabilities approach, in both the article and Lobel’s recent book.4  We 
think these different normative frameworks might matter significantly, in 
evaluating whether the developments she describes should be of concern and 
also in terms of how we might design institutional responses.  That is to say 
that, for us, Lobel’s project is most interesting because of its capacity to frame 
a comparative institutional analysis.  
From this starting point we make two modest suggestions for researchers.  
First, we suggest that those building on Lobel’s work consider more contextual 
description and evaluation of human and intellectual capital production 
systems.  Doing so would avoid overly abstract, macro-level analysis that is 
often divorced from reality and from the critical nuances that shape actors’ 
individual and collective motivations and behavior.  It would also avoid 
excessive reliance on overly specific, micro-level analysis, which can be 
anecdotal.  Second, we emphasize the importance of establishing normative 
baselines prior to evaluating or prescribing reform. 
In Part II of this reply essay, we highlight why the sort of cross-cutting 
yet resource-specific approach Lobel uses matters.  Human capital is different 
from intellectual capital in a number of important ways that shape legal and 
other governance institutions and our evaluations of such institutions.  By 
identifying the existing, blurred boundaries and defining the contours of the 
field, Professor Lobel has revealed new terrain to be explored,5 again both for 
its own sake (that is, because of the importance of better understanding how 
we govern human capital) and for what it tells us about the various areas of 
law influenced directly or indirectly by governance of human capital (for 
example, the continued expansion of intellectual property law). 
 
2. Id. at 790. 
3. See id. at 859 (identifying the constitutional beneficiaries of intellectual property rights and 
discussing the public welfare implications); id. at 849 (describing the inefficiencies created by the 
new cognitive property in the context of Silicon Valley “job hopping”). 
4. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1, at 846; ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE 
SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 235 (2013) (discussing the limits on 
one’s capability to create ideas when there is increased  control over human capital). 
5. This is, of course, quite rare for legal scholarship and is thus exciting. 
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We then complicate the descriptive picture Professor Lobel paints by 
suggesting that a more contextual depiction of systems of intellectual and 
human capital production may be necessary in order to fully appreciate the 
relationships between human and intellectual capital and associated 
governance institutions.  We use the university science and technology system 
as an illustrative example.  We do so because it is a system one of us has 
previously explored in a way that relates quite well to Professor Lobel’s 
project.  But we emphasize that university science is just an example—one 
could focus on any number of other examples in the industrial, government, 
and nonprofit sectors, where the normative objectives of production systems, 
and the corresponding governance institutions, vary considerably.6 
We discuss the normative baseline issue in Part III, and we briefly explore 
some ideas for establishing a normative baseline from which to evaluate and 
consider reforming human capital law.  This is a tentative suggestion, meant 
to support and even provoke continued exploration in future work.  
Specifically, we suggest that Professor Lobel’s normative ambiguity is no 
different than the normative ambiguity endemic to the field of intellectual 
capital law (or intellectual property law, if you prefer).  To make progress in 
either field, we need to figure out what we are aiming for—to establish with 
much greater specificity the ends we seek to achieve through intellectual and 
human capital laws.  Rehearsing buzzwords like “innovation” or mantras like 
“Progress in Science and the Useful Arts” is neither meaningful nor helpful.7  
The same can be said for simply deferring to “markets” (e.g., letting 
willingness to pay be determinative) or “politics” (e.g., letting Congress 
decide).  For both human and intellectual capital, we need a more systematic 
approach to the normative analysis.  We briefly argue in favor of using the 
capabilities approach but leave a complete analysis for future work. 
II. Describing and Evaluating Human and Intellectual Capital Systems 
Professor Lobel has made a strong case that human capital law is a 
cognizable field of law that deserves more rigorous study.  It is too easily 
 
6. In the terms we have previously used, university science is probably a “meso, sector-specific 
context,” within which to study the effect of various institutional designs.  See Brett M. Frischmann 
& Mark P. McKenna, Comparative Analysis of (Innovation) Failures and Institutions in Context 9–
13 (Sept. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (distinguishing between “micro, 
small-scale” contexts; “meso, sector-specific” contexts; and “macro” contexts for comparative 
institutional analysis). 
7. Id. at 6. 
It is tempting to ignore these potential differences and simply assume that the Progress 
clause refers to one or another of these objectives, or simply to brush the issue under the 
rug by hiding the ambiguity in a general claim that IP should promote ‘innovation,’ as if 
‘innovation’ were one thing, and in fact claims that certain legal systems better ‘promote 
innovation’ are quite common despite all the evidence that has accumulated about the 
differential effects of various policies across industries. 
Id. 
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ignored or regarded as a mere adjunct to, or subset of, other “host” fields, 
particularly intellectual property or employment law.8  Yet the consequences 
of such inattention can be devastating.  First, human capital law itself may be 
ill-formed and not well-tailored to the development and deployment of human 
capital in society.  This alone can have significant consequences for the 
economy and social welfare.  Professor Lobel begins to explore these 
consequences in sections II and III of her article, and she usefully opens the 
field for much more research in this area. 
That additional research needs to be done.  For while there is a significant 
body of research on the economic and social value of human capital and 
development, 9  the lurking normative, empirical, and institutional design 
questions remain un(der)-examined.  And the time is ripe.  The past decade of 
economic turmoil, coupled with rapid technological development in various 
fields (from automation to information and communications technologies), has 
brought human capital development and deployment to the forefront of 
economic policy around the world.   
Second, failing to appreciate human capital law as its own field with its 
own nuances (in terms of demands, politics, institutional design, technicalities, 
and so on) may lead to distortions in the “host” fields.  Professor Lobel 
documents this phenomenon at length with respect to intellectual property in 
Part I of her article.  Specifically, she describes how human capital controls 
distort intellectual property law in three interrelated dimensions: subject-
matter, duration, and the scope of exclusive rights.10  Not coincidentally, the 
distortions are all expansionary. 
 Given the recognized importance of human capital, why would human 
capital law be ignored or conflated with other related fields?  This is a question 
with which Professor Lobel does not fully engage, but it is worth asking.  It is 
possible that the failure to recognize human capital law as a cognate field is 
strategic, in the sense that political and economic actors take advantage of the 
current situation. 11   It may be due to a lag between legal and economic 
research—it may take years (even decades) to translate or incorporate 
theoretical and empirical research in economics on human capital.  Failure to 
 
8. Though tempting, we do not frame the question of whether human capital law ought to be 
recognized as a distinct field in terms of the “law of the horse” debate that has long vexed internet 
law.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–
08 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
501, 501 n.1 (1999). 
9. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE HUMAN CAPITAL REPORT (2013) [hereinafter WORLD 
ECON. FORUM], available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_HumanCapitalReport_2013.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/B3JN-G5QE; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014 SUSTAINING HUMAN PROGRESS: REDUCING VULNERABILITIES AND 
BUILDING RESILIENCE (2014), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-
1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BYA4-6BM4. 
10. Lobel, supra note 1, at 792–93. 
11. This is seen in Lobel’s description of human capital controls being used to expand 
intellectual property controls.  See Lobel, supra note 1, at 791–92. 
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regard human capital law as its own field may be a result of reductionism in 
the face of the complexity of human capital as a resource or resource system.  
And it may simply be an artifact of legal formalism.  We think it’s likely some 
combination of these and other reasons.  
Professor Lobel highlights how the state of affairs for human capital law 
is not so different, or far behind, the state of affairs for intellectual capital law.  
As she notes: 
[L]egal scholarship on human capital remains surprisingly thin.  The 
traditional and underdeveloped analysis of human capital law views 
controls over human capital as necessary to generate investment and 
growth.  At the same time, a growing body of empirical evidence 
indicates that excessive human capital controls have detrimental effects.  
Law’s role in safeguarding and promoting human capital as a shared 
resource is little understood.  A closer study of human capital law 
regimes suggests that the most successful regional economies have 
relied on legal regimes that nurture a cognitive commons, protect 
mobility, and encourage the densification of knowledge networks.12 
Something very similar could be said for intellectual capital, the 
detrimental effects of excessive intellectual capital controls, and the barely 
understood role of law in safeguarding and promoting intellectual capital as a 
shared resource.13  Yet while the fields of human and intellectual capital are 
undoubtedly interdependent in practice and in Professor Lobel’s article, there 
are important differences between the underlying resources governed by 
human capital law and intellectual capital law. 
Let us begin with what these resources have in common—capital.14  Both 
human and intellectual capital resources are durable inputs that generate value 
when used productively.15  These resources satisfy demand derived from the 
goods produced, and thus we can say the resources are means rather than 
ends.16  Economists refer to capital goods as “factors of production” that are 
not used up, exhausted, or otherwise transformed and incorporated fully into 
the final output on consumption, unlike raw materials (e.g., coal) or 
intermediate goods (e.g., a screw).17  With such durability comes reusability, 
 
12. Id. at 792. 
13. On how and why intellectual property law is as much about safeguarding and promoting 
knowledge commons as intellectual property rights, see generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 253–314 (2012) [hereinafter 
INFRASTRUCTURE]; GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Frischmann, Madison, & Strandburg 
eds., 2014); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
14. This paragraph is adapted from INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 24–57. 
15. Id. at 33. 
16. Id. at 33–34. 
17. Id. at 34. 
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a virtue that often makes capital investments worthwhile over longer time 
periods.18  Think about investment in education, for example. 
Intellectual resources are pure public goods (meaning the resources are 
non-rivalrous in consumption for the entire range of demand), often a form of 
capital, often the source of various types of externalities, often integral parts 
of cultural, intellectual, and social progress, and generally constitutive of 
dynamic and complex resource systems that are not easily reducible to discrete 
elements or parcels.19  There is too much in the previous sentence to unpack in 
this Response.  The point is simply to highlight the range of complex 
characteristics that frustrate simple models and continue to plague descriptive 
accounts of intellectual capital law.   
The point is also that human capital shares most of these characteristics, 
as the university science and technology system example below illustrates.  
But human capital is not exactly a pure public good, at least not in the 
conventional economic sense.   
Human capital is rivalrous and excludable: the human capital one has 
invested in and built up through time, money and effort spent on her education, 
for example, is possessed by her alone, consumed rivalrously as she chooses 
to exploit it, and cheaply excluded through her own efforts.  One’s education 
affects her behavior in many ways that affect others, which is why human 
capital is often said to generate (beneficial) externalities.  And one’s education 
may provide her with the capability to produce various public and social goods 
that benefit not only her but others as well.  But the skills and knowledge20 one 
has gained through her education are her own; others may obtain the same 
skills and knowledge, of course, but only by educating themselves. 
The rivalrousness of human capital, however, is limited in certain 
respects.  It is not the skills and knowledge per se that are consumed 
rivalrously, but rather their inputs—a person’s time, effort, and attention.  The 
skills and knowledge can be taught to another person, at a positive cost that 
may vary considerably based on the skill in question and the person being 
taught.21  No person’s use of those skills or knowledge “consumes” them; such 
use does not deplete or reduce the available skills or knowledge.  Moreover, 
and perhaps more importantly from a human capital perspective, a person 
possessing a particular skill can reuse the skill because it is not depleted upon 
 
18. See id. at 33 n.24 (using a tractor as an example of the durability and renewability of capital 
goods). 
19. Id. at 253–314. 
20. Referring to Fritz Machlup, Karl Polanyi, and others, Lobel describes skills—the “art of 
doing”—as a subset of knowledge.  Lobel, supra note 1, at 835 (citing FRITZ MACHLUP, THE 
PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 379–80 (1962) and 
MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 54 (1958)). 
21. The capacity to perform the skill, like the capacity to learn, is in itself an important variable 
to consider.  In the context of knowledge or innovation studies, it may be referred to as absorptive 
capacity.  A systems-based approach to investigating, designing, and evaluating human and 
intellectual capital would need to account for these more basic capabilities. 
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use; in fact, reuse may improve the durability and quality of the skills—as it is 
said, “practice makes perfect.”  Yet such use and reuse of the skill remains 
exclusive to the person (or persons) possessing the skill.  
It is the durable, nondepletable, and reusable nature of human capital that 
makes it similar to a public good.  A person’s time, effort and attention are 
rivalrously consumed, but a person’s skills and knowledge are productively 
used and not consumed.   
For most of her article, Professor Lobel talks in terms of inputs and 
outputs and suggests that demand for control over intellectual capital outputs 
is what drives human capital law to provide control over the inputs, which can 
include both human capital and intellectual capital.  This is an important source 
of tension, which Professor Lobel describes well.  But while the input/output 
framing is useful for describing the demand for control, 22  it does not 
completely describe human capital.   
Late in her article, Professor Lobel defines human capital as “the stock of 
knowledge in all its multiple forms that contributes to productive work, 
including knowledge that is noncodifiable as well as knowledge that expresses 
itself in skills and know-how, in relationships and networks, in creativity and 
motivation, and in the ability to disrupt and energize.” 23   This definition 
reveals how human capital overlaps with intellectual capital and social capital.  
Yet it is perhaps too focused on knowledge, making human capital appear to 
be a special subset of intellectual capital.  
Another viable definition would connect human capital to labor and a 
human’s capacity to be meaningfully productive, whether or not such 
productivity entails the employment of intellectual capital.  Thus, a physically 
strong person, or even just a physically healthy person, might be capable of 
performing certain tasks as a consequence of her physical capability and some 
would include that capability as a form of human capital.24  Thus, in addition 
to education and training, health care is often described as one of the most 
important investments in human capital.25 
A definition of human capital that extends beyond skills and knowledge 
to include physical capabilities puts some stress on the characterization of 
 
22. We refer to the input-output framing as shorthand to refer to the mechanism by which demand 
for control over intellectual capital (outputs) leads to demand for controls over human capital (inputs).  
As the university science and technology system example shows, both types of capital can be both 
inputs and outputs. 
23. Lobel, supra note 1, at 834. 
24. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 9, at 3 (“[I]n recent years, health (including 
physical capacities, cognitive function and mental health) has come to be seen as a fundamental 
component of human capital.”). 
25. Id. (“The Index is thus based on four pillars: three core determinants of human capital 
(education, health and employment) plus those factors that allow these three core determinants to 
translate into greater returns.”); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 17 (3d ed. 1994) (“Education and 
training are the most important investments in human capital.”). 
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human capital as having public-good features, as the durability of physical 
capabilities may wax and wane over time.  Use and reuse of physical 
capabilities may improve the durability and quality of the capabilities, or it 
may cause wear and tear and deterioration over time.  We do not take a position 
on the definitional question, but we raise the issue to highlight how human 
capital encompasses a broad range of different resources.26  
Lobel connects human and intellectual capital through a “novel taxonomy 
of the multiple facets of knowledge as it inhabits contemporary talent pools.”27  
The taxonomy includes five types of knowledge: tacit, relational, networked, 
motivational, and disruptive knowledge.28  Though these types of knowledge 
have been discussed extensively elsewhere, Professor Lobel usefully brings 
them together to highlight their relevance to the emerging field of human 
capital law and to preface her cautionary message about the Third Enclosure 
Movement.  Though her treatment is brief, it serves her purposes well.  Indeed, 
we were particularly interested in her emphasis on relational knowledge, 
which includes but does not exist solely within individuals and therefore is not 
as neatly categorized. 
But Lobel’s taxonomy does not describe fully the relationships between 
human capital and intellectual capital in the complex systems and 
environments where humans interact with various resources to generate human 
and intellectual capital, often in recursive, dynamic and highly uncertain 
processes.  We do not mean this as a criticism, as such a description is beyond 
the scope of her article and would require much more attention to specific 
systems in context.  But we highlight it as a promising direction for future 
research.  One of us previously made a preliminary attempt to explore these 
relationships in the context of university science and technology systems.  
Consider a university science and technology system as an example of a 
complex system with many different capital inputs (human, intellectual, 
governance, physical, financial) and outputs (intellectual and human capital): 
 A university science and technology research system is a system of 
productive resources aggregated within a university setting and used to 
produce a stream of research-related outputs, as well as other important 
outputs, e.g., educated citizens.  The system is comprised of at least five 
different sets of related, complementary resources, including 
1. human capital, including complementary networks of people 
such as professors, researchers, students, administrators, 
technicians, and other support staff; 
 
26. For the sake of brevity, we have not discussed social capital, which also was implicated in 
Professor Lobel’s definition.  The relational nature of social capital is, we think, quite important to a 
broader system-based approach to human capital, as the university science and technology system 
example suggests. 
27. Lobel, supra note 1, at 834. 
28. Id. at 834–38. 
239 Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 93:231 
 
2. governance capital, such as rules, norms, policies and other 
collective constraints that guide system participants’ behavior; 
3. physical capital, such as land, facilities, and equipment; 
4. intellectual capital, such as knowledge, information, and ideas; 
and 
5. financial capital. 
 Each of these capital resources is an essential component of the 
system, although the bundle of such resources and manner in which they 
are bundled varies considerably across universities.  I have referred to 
the various components of the system as capital because, aggregated 
together within a university, these resources are used (and reused) 
collectively and continuously as inputs into a variety of production 
processes, including research, education, training, and socialization, 
among others.   
Figure One: Simple View of University Science and Technology 
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 These production processes yield a wide variety of research-related 
outputs, which can be grouped into two major categories—intellectual 
capital and human capital.  Intellectual capital outputs are the intangible 
information goods, essentially the research results, that may or may not 
be embedded in some artifact (e.g., equipment design), be fixated in 
some tangible form (e.g., written down), or simply reside in the minds 
of researchers (e.g., tacit knowledge).  Generally, when we refer to 
“science,” “research,” “invention,” “innovation,” “technology,” and so 
on, we are talking about various types of intellectual capital that are 
outputs from some intellectual process.  These outputs are public goods 
with varying potentials to yield positive externalities (or conversely, 
appropriable benefits) when utilized productively.  The types of uses 
may vary considerably. 
 Equally if not more important than pure intellectual capital outputs 
are human capital outputs—people with (1) higher levels of education, 
knowledge, experience, and research-oriented skills who are (2) 
prepared for entry into the research community.29  The importance of 
human capital outputs is well-understood.  Many commentators, such 
as Richard Florida, have emphasized the critical role of U.S. 
universities in educating and training (graduate) students—in creating 
“talent” that fuels the knowledge economy.  Education, knowledge, 
experience, and research-oriented skills must be absorbed by students 
and consequently often are standardized (in contrast with the cutting-
 
 29. It is important to realize that socialization is an important aspect of the university science 
and technology research system.  Students are prepared for entry into the research community, for 
example, by gaining familiarity with professional norms and ethics and forming relationships with 
members of the community.  Most undergraduate or graduate students have limited real-world 
experience and very little (if any) experience in dealing with professionals as a member of the 
professional community.  In law school, for example, we place a significant emphasis on the fact that 
students will be entering a profession, that they will be members of the bar, and that a host of ethical 
and even less formal community norms apply to members.  The law school experience, in part, 
consists of a socialization process that prepares the students for professional membership.  A very 
similar dynamic exists within the university research setting, although it is less explicit and less formal 
than in the law school setting. 
OUTPUTS: 
Human Capital: People 
 Skilled labor 
 Research community members 
Intellectual Capital: Research Results 
 Basic  applied  
 Commercial  noncommercial 
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edge nature of the research result outputs).  Once absorbed through the 
processes of research, education, and training, the intellectual capital 
residing within the university science and technology research system 
is disseminated and shared.  Thus, research-oriented education, 
knowledge, experience, and skills may be viewed as forms of 
intellectual capital that are disseminated to students and used 
productively to augment universities’ human capital. 
. . . .  
 Both intellectual and human capital outputs generate value when used 
productively as inputs. . . . For the most part, then, universities are 
“vertically integrated” with respect to the production of research 
systems and research-related outputs; some outputs are consumed 
internally while others are consumed externally.  The manner in which 
the outputs are used depends, of course, on the nature of the specific 
outputs. 
 Viewed as an integrated system of complementary resources that 
generate value primarily when used to produce various streams of 
research-related outputs, the university science and technology research 
system begins to look like other forms of infrastructural capital. 
 University science and technology research systems are “sharable” in 
the sense that multiple users may access and use the system resources 
to engage in productive processes and produce research-related outputs.  
Some components of the system have infinite capacity (i.e., are purely 
nonrival in consumption)—such as intellectual and governance 
capital—while others have finite capacity (i.e., are rival in 
consumption)—such as physical, financial, and human capital.  It is the 
scarcity of these latter types of capital resources that drives competition 
for funding, prestige, and resource allocation decisions. . . . [T]o some 
extent, rivalrousness within the system is what puts pressure on 
universities to optimize the system for commercial outputs; the 
appropriable benefits (revenues) generated by such outputs may provide 
the resources necessary to sustain the system.30 
 
The example illustrates how varied the range of inputs and outputs can 
be across different contexts.  Because different universities have very different 
objectives (goals, aims, normative values) for their university science and 
technology systems, their governance regimes also vary considerably.  Thus, 
some universities may seek to specialize and develop institutional governance 
regimes to encourage the development of certain types of outputs—for 
example, patentable and commercializable research.  Others may take a more 
general approach and seek to avoid specialization, in which case a different 
 
30. The excerpt is from Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 
2149–54 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
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institutional governance regime would be appropriate.  Industrial and 
governmental science and technology systems similarly entail variety in these 
dimensions and exploring those differences is what we need to do collectively 
as researchers. 
Interestingly, though beyond the scope of this short Response, the role 
that patents have played in universities provides a case study that fits well with 
many of Professor Lobel’s observations.  The introduction of patents within 
the university science and technology system as a means for controlling 
intellectual capital outputs (patentable research results) led to some interesting 
shifts in governance, such as shifts in tenure standards and publication 
practices.  It would be interesting to investigate more systematically 
university-specific examples of human capital controls, such as publication 
controls, tenure standards, rules for spin-offs, funding, and restrictive licensing 
practices, among others.   
III. Ambiguity in Professor Lobel’s Normative Baseline 
As we suggested, for us the most interesting part of Professor Lobel’s 
article is her caution “against the devastating effects of the growing enclosure 
of cognitive capacities in contemporary markets.”31  
This normative challenge seems to be grounded primarily in conventional 
law and economics, given her references to efficiency and welfare.  But there 
are also undercurrents of alternatives, such as Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach, in Professor Lobel’s analysis.32  In the end, we find it difficult to 
assess in the aggregate the various types of evidence Professor Lobel discusses 
because the normative objectives against which we might make such an 
assessment are somewhat ambiguous.  To state it simply: What exactly is she 
worried about? 
In our view, Professor Lobel’s concern can be interpreted in three 
different, but related, ways.  First, her concern might be about human capital 
law following the path of enclosure that we have witnessed over the last 
century in the field of intellectual capital law.  Professor Lobel implies that the 
various bodies of law that govern human capital have increasingly aimed to 
delineate and protect property rights in human capital.  Such an enclosure 
would implicate a host of normative concerns, ranging from an erosion of First 
Amendment protections for freedom of thought and association to the more 
conventional economic and distributional concerns.   
 
31. Lobel, supra note 1, at 790. 
32. Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, Lecture Delivered at Stanford University (May 22, 1979), 
in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 197, 218–19 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980) 
(Sen’s approach rejects conventional economic measures of wellbeing and instead substitutes “‘basic 
capabilities,’” identifying those as “being able to do certain basic things,” and emphasizing that using 
this approach to assessing wellbeing shifts attention from “goods to what goods do to human 
beings.”). 
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Second, her concern might be that human capital laws are increasingly 
being extended to control more than human capital, and specifically to control 
intellectual capital.  That is, human capital laws may be used as tools of 
intellectual capital enclosure, either as substitutes for or adjuncts to more 
conventional intellectual property laws.  Such developments also would 
implicate a host of normative concerns, but not necessarily the same ones 
implicated by enclosure of human capital as such.   
Third, and related to the first two interpretations, Professor Lobel’s 
concern might be that human capital laws and intellectual property laws both 
are being misused, whether intentionally or not, as tools to exercise control 
over both types of resources with interdependent effects.  For example, some 
firms may intend to use human capital laws to control intellectual capital but 
end up controlling human capital, and vice versa.  Comprehensive use of both 
human capital and intellectual property laws may have net effects that extend 
beyond control of the two types of capital resources, for example, where 
employees themselves appear to be indistinguishable from the owned 
resources.   
These three different interpretations are each valid and important, and 
indeed Professor Lobel might well have intended to make all three claims.  We 
emphasize the variations in these three different ways of understanding her 
concern simply to highlight the fact that difficulty in identifying the precise 
nature of her concern makes it more difficult to design institutional responses.  
This is perfectly reasonable given the nature of her ambitious article, which 
not only establishes a new field and calls for its recognition, but also warns of 
possibly devastating consequences.  Nevertheless, the significance of the 
consequences can only be evaluated within some normative framework, and 
the normative ambiguity thus weakens her warning. 
As we have discussed elsewhere, the failure to establish a normative 
baseline from which to evaluate the current state of affairs and possible future 
developments is endemic to intellectual property law scholarship, and dare we 
say, legal scholarship in general.  Scholarship that purports to analyze and 
evaluate legal decisions, doctrines, institutions or systems requires a normative 
baseline from which to perform the evaluation.  We recognize that many 
scholars proceed with an implicit normative baseline in mind.  We have done 
so often ourselves.  But this engenders ambiguity and weakens analysis and 
evaluation. 
As we have argued elsewhere, appeals to the IP Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and the idea that law should promote Progress in Science and the 
Useful Arts are often unhelpful.  Such appeals typically suggest that IP is 
fundamentally utilitarian and that maximizing social welfare, measured in 
terms of utility, is the appropriate normative objective.  This too is 
problematic.  As we have explained, there is nothing about the text or history 
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of the IP Clause that requires that IP laws be utilitarian.33  Perhaps they should 
be; perhaps that would be a decent normative baseline to use in our evaluation 
and institutional design.  But that baseline is not dictated by the IP Clause. 
What ought to be the normative baseline for intellectual or human capital 
law?  We think this is an open question that deserves more attention.  Two 
consequentialist approaches appear to be frontrunners—utilitarianism and 
human flourishing.  A synergy of the two might even be appropriate.34  Both 
approaches offer reasonable, broad conceptions from which to establish a 
normative baseline, but each faces considerable challenges.  These are 
challenges that scholars should meet directly rather than assuming them 
away.35   
The Capabilities Approach 36  in particular appears to us to be 
underexplored and underutilized within both the intellectual and human capital 
fields.  This approach rejects conventional economic measures of well-being 
(utility, happiness, wealth) in favor of an alternative measure (capabilities).  
Capabilities are opportunities or freedoms to realize actual, “real-life” 
achievements.  Sen and many others employing the Capabilities Approach 
write about how society is, or would be, better off investing in the capabilities 
of individuals to be and do what they have reason to value.37  The approach 
thus seems to resonate quite strongly with human capital and the objective of 
developing humans’ capacity to be meaningfully productive, a capability that 
individuals have reason to value.  Moreover, the Capabilities Approach already 
has influenced development economics and human development policy, as 
reflected in the United Nation’s Human Development Index. 38   The HDI 
provides a useful measurement tool that captures various aspects of human 
development and capabilities related to education, health, and income.   
 
33. Frischmann & McKenna, supra note 6. 
34 . Cf. Brett M. Frischmann, Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual Progress: Toward a 
Human Flourishing Theory for Intellectual Property, in VALUE PLURALISM AND IP LAW (Shyam 
Balganesh & Haochen Sun eds., forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500196, archived at http://perma.cc/4RNP-
QERW (considering the possible intersection of utilitarianism and human flourishing theories in IP). 
35. Regardless of the normative baseline chosen, however, we suggest that scholars should 
establish explicit normative baselines prior to evaluation or prescription of reform. 
36 . See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); AMARTYA SEN, 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1st ed., 1999); SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS: SEN’S 
CAPABILITY APPROACH AND POVERTY REDUCTION (2002); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); Amartya Sen, Human Rights and 
Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151 (2005). 
37. See supra note 36. 
38. Human Development Index, UNITED NATIONS DEV. REP., http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ 
human-development-index-hdi, archived at http://perma.cc/B5XA-AMJJ (providing the latest HDI 
data); Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and 
Building Resilience, UNITED NATIONS DEV. REP., http://hdr.undp.org/en/2014-report/download, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A43X-CDNP.  See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 36, at 59. 
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Even short of settling the normative baseline question, we think scholars 
engaging in comparative institutional analysis could make progress by 
evaluating different institutional regimes using a scenario analysis, where 
different scenarios corresponded to different normative baselines. 39   Then 
meta-analyses would tell us something about our institutional design options.  
As applied to human capital law, we might suggest scenario analyses that 
expressly considered institutional design for purposes of promoting a variety 
of different ends implied by Professor Lobel—for promoting certain kinds of 
innovation, for increasing employment opportunities, for promoting small 
business development, etc.  It may turn out that the same institutional design 
principles serve many of these goals.  But it seems likely (or at least possible) 
that there will sometimes be conflict between, say, promoting human 
capabilities and promoting economic efficiency, at least when efficiency is 
narrowly defined.  Scenario analyses allow us to see the points of consistency 
and of divergence. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Professor Lobel’s important article identifies and describes the new field 
of human capital, and it highlights a number of causes for concern.  In our 
view, its biggest contribution is its opening up of new lines of scholarly 
inquiry, and particularly setting the stage for comparative institutional 
analysis.  We encourage researchers to build on Lobel’s work with context-
specific studies that are sensitive to the range of the relationships between 
human capital and intellectual capital and the complex systems in which they 
interact.  And we hope that researchers put the normative baseline question 




39. There is a rich literature on the approach.  In his book, The Economic Dynamics of Law, 
David Driesen argues for the use of scenario analysis in various contexts, with particular emphasis on 
environmental law where scenario analysis would supplement and/or replace cost-benefit analysis.  
DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW (2012).  See also Frischmann & McKenna, 
supra note 6. 
